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ABSTRACT
Many United States railroads today are in financial difficulty.
In the northeast, the federal government has stepped in, forming ConRail
and investing, to date, $6.4 billion. The Department of Transportation
is currently looking at midwestern railroads, which are also in trouble.
One of the railroads in this report--the Rock Island--is already
bankrupt. The other four railroads dealt with in this report are the
Chicago & North Western, the Burlington Northern, the Milwaukee Road,
and the Soo Line.
The present study traces the economic history of these five
midwestern railroads and identifies four major factors that have contri-
buted to their economic plight--growth of railroad regulations, increased
competition from other modes of transportation, low rate of return on
investment and the related problem of unwise West Coast extension
construction, and empire building.
Federal regulations have affected all five lines, as has increased
competition from other modes of transportation. The Soo Line has adjusted
better to increased competition due to its structure as a small railroad
serving specific farming and mining needs with a modern rate structure.
Low rate-of-return on investment has also affected all railroads,
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especially the Milwaukee Road and the Rock Island. Both incurred huge
debts and financially draining interest payments as the result of
attempting to build or buy costly and impractical extensions from Chicago
to the West Coast. The Burlington Northern has remained financially
healthy because it built one West Coast route with federal aid in the
form of land grants paying for the construction and purchased two other
bankrupt extensions at well below market value. Finally, empire
building applies mainly to the Chicago & North Western, built by
William Ogden, and the Burlington Northern, put together by James Hill,
and also the Soo Line, built by local interests in response to the unfair
practices of the empire builders.
The important policy issues concerning railroads are whether the
federal government should take action to aid specific railroads and
railroads in general, and if so, what form this aid should take. Also
of concern is what policies the federal government can implement to deal
with the four specific problems mentioned. Unfortunately, it was beyond
the scope of this thesis to deal with specific policy questions.
However, this thesis provides useful background information for formu-
lating future policies. For example, the author is following this
study with a detailed look at how federal policy concerning changes in
the rate structure can affect railroad and barge traffic in the
Mississippi River Valley.
Name and Title of Thesis Supervisor: Karen R. Polenske
Associate Professor of
Regional Planning
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PREFACE
Many railroads today are in financial difficulty. Several rail-
roads in the northeast went bankrupt and have been reorganized together
as ConRail. Meanwhile, midwestern railroads are beginning to experience
serious financial difficulties as well. Because the federal government
is currently considering whether to aid midwestern railroads, they are
the focus of this thesis. The thesis deals with why some of them are in
financial difficulty today, by tracing the economic history of five
particular midwestern railroads. Historically, they have suffered as a
result of four economic factors--growth of railroad regulations, increased
competition from other modes of transportation, low rate of return on
investment, and empire building. These four factors are discussed, and
the development of the five midwestern railroads is traced in light of
these factors. The five are the Chicago & North Western, the Burlington
Northern, the Milwaukee Road, the Rock Island, and the Soo Line. One of
the five railroads discussed--the Rock Island--is already bankrupt.
As the federal government considers various courses of action to
handle the "railroad problem," it is important to keep in mind how the
railroads came into their present situation. The empire building of
William Ogden, with the Chicago & North Western, and James Hill, with the
Burlington Northern, are traced. But even at the height of their empires
in the early 1910's, the two railroads were returning only a three to five
percent rate of return on original investment. Much of the original
investment of the Burlington Northern came from the government in the form
of land grants, which were used to finance three separate routes to the
West Coast. The Milwaukee Road, envious of the Burlington Northern, built
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its own West Coast extension and has suffered from a shortage of capital
ever since. The owners of the Rock Island were so desperate for an
extension of their own that they set up an illegal holding company, which
purchased a sourthern West Coast extension with money that existed only
in their books. Through court action, the illegal companies were broken
up, and the Rock Island, too,has suffered from a shortage of capital evet
since. Of the five railroads, only the Soo Line can be said to be doing
well, although the Burlington Northern is currently in no financial danger.
The Soo was built to serve grain farmers who objected to paying monopoly
charges to the large railroad companies. The Soo has remained small and
has concentrated on profitable commodity traffic, mainly grains from the
farmers and ores from the mines.
Railroads have suffered from competition with other modes of trans-
portation, especially trucks. Although railroads have received no govern-
ment aid in the 20th century until recently, trucks have received billions
of dollars in aid in the form of highway construction. But railroads are
still economically more efficient than trucks in hauling bulky, low-cost-
per-ton commodities over long distances. These are the commodities,
especially coal, on which the Soo Line and the Burlington Northern are
concentrating. With the government setting the minimum and maximum rates
railroads can charge, often ignoring factors of truck competition, the
railroads are often encumbered in their attempts to compete with trucks
by heavy regulation. The government can also force railroads to continue
operating unprofitable lines and prohibit mergers and agreements that
would cut down on costly duplication of railroad lines. Only recently
have the regulatory agencies realized the responsibility of their power.
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They are now attempting to be more responsive to the needs of railroads,
in light of the factors facing railroads today. This new awareness is
an attempt, on the part of the government, to be more equitable in its
treatment of the various components of the transportation industry. It
is also a response to increased environmental concern. Being more energy-
efficient and less polluting, railroads are far less damaging to the
environment than trucks. Railroad tracks are also under-utilized, while
highways are already operating beyond their intended capacities. It is
therefore in the public interest to support railroads.
This thesis is part of a series of studies being done for the
University Research Program, U.S. Department of Transportation, to present
analyses of multiregional policy issues for the United States. It is one
of three studies that specifically addresses the railroad problem. The
first was an analysis of projected 1980 demand for rail service on the
five railroads already mentioned, John Pucher's DOT Report No. 14,
"Projections of 1980 Freight Demands for Selected Railroads." The second
is this thesis. The third is an analysis of the effect of altering the
rate structure on railroads and barges in the Mississippi River Valley,
currently being done by this author.
The research reported in this thesis was financed with funds from
Contract No. DOT-OS-30104 between the University Research Program, U.S.
Department of Transportation, and the Department of Urban Studies and
Planning, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Cambridge, Massachusetts.
The author takes full responsibility for the conclusions, which are not
necessarily those of the sponsoring agency.
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AN ECONOMIC HISTORY OF FIVE MIDWESTERN RAILROADS
by
Gary M. Kaitz
Most American railroads today are in financial difficulties.
Several of the largest eastern lines are bankrupt, causing potential
harm to the areas they serve. Under the assumption that railroads are
economically beneficial for a region, the federal government has begun to
aid them. The United States Railway Association (USRA) was created to
help with the reorganization of bankrupt railroads and to provide them
with financial assistance. Additionally, Amtrak, a private corporation,
has been formed to operate commuter services, most of which were and still
are unprofitable, with the U.S. government making up the deficit.
Conrail, another private corporation, was recently organized
by the USRA to operate six major northeastern railroads--the Penn
Central, Erie-Lackawanna, Reading, Lehigh Valley, Ann Arbor, and
New Jersey Central--all of which are bankrupt. Conrail is expected,
with substantial government assistance, to eventually become self-
sufficient. It is also possible, though unlikely, that Conrail may
later be in a position to repay its government loans. So far, the
USRA has received $6.4 billion, primarily to set up Conrail.
The USRA divides the United States roughly into four regions:
the Northeast, the Midwest, the South, and the West. Since most rail-
roads in the Northeast are already bankrupt, the USRA decided to act
there first (by creating Conrail). It is generally believed that many
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railroads in the Midwest will soon be bankrupt, while most railroads
in the South and West are still financially sound. Thus, attention
is beginning to be focussed on the midwestern railroads. The USRA is
considering many alternatives to aid these lines, one such alternative
being the geographical expansion of Conrail.
In this report, the emphasis..is on five major midwestern rail-
roads, several of which are likely to become bankrupt within the next
few years, and one of which--the Rock Island--is already bankrupt. The
economic history of the five railroads is traced here to clarify
their current financial condition and to aid the USRA, as well as the
Department of Transportation itself, in anticipating their future needs,
so as to provide effective federal assistance should that become advis-
able. The five railroads are:
1) The Chicago & North Western,1
2) The Burlington Northern,
3) The Milwaukee Road--officially the Chicago, Milwaukee,
St. Paul, & Pacific,
4) The Rock Island--officially the Chicago, Rock Island,
& Pacific, and
5) The Soo Line.
In using railroad names, an ampersand is used to connect words
within a railroad title, while an "and" is used to connect two or more
titles. Thus, although the official name of the company is "the Chicago
and North Western," the company is referred to in this report as "the
Chicago & North Western," whereas two companies are referred to as, say,
"the Rock Island and the Soo Line."
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FEDERAL AID TO RAILROADS
Federal aid to railroads is not new. The first bill to aid
railroads was passed on September 20, 1850. It granted more than two
million acres of federally owned land in Illinois to the State of
Illinois for the purpose of building a state railroad. (The railroad
was later organized into the Illinois Central.) But this was not the
first use of land grants to aid in the development of transportation.
Up to 1850, government and private developers of highways (wagon
trails) and canals had been granted 3.5 million acres of land each,
or 7.0 million in all. Although railroad land grants were very con-
troversial, by the time the last grant was awarded--in 1906--approxi-
mately 223 million acres of land had been granted, of which 180
million acres (81 percent) were eventually claimed by railroads.2 The
lands not used by the railroads were sold by them to the public as a
means of acquiring capital, and, in time, promoting profitable busi-
ness for the lines by spurring land development. Any assessment of
the railroads' profits from the sale of these lands depends on the
method of accounting used. Ellis and others [17], for example, made
an estimate that profits totaled slightly over 700 million dollars
between 1850 and 1940, by which time most of the lands had been sold.
2Land grants were often conditioned upon the actual building of
a railroad line. Since the grants were sometimes used by the rail-
roads as collateral on federal loans, the land was occasionally
reclaimed by the government when loans were defaulted. Also, Congress
would sometimes reverse itself and reclaim lands granted but not yet
legally deeded to the railroad.
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A railroad that received a land grant actually received only a
strip of land--typically six to ten miles wide--along each side of a
proposed railroad line. This strip was divided into one-mile squares,
or sections, with the railroad receiving alternate sections and the
government retaining the other sections. This plan allowed the govern-
ment to profit from land grants as well. The theory was that the rail-
road line, when completed, and the railroad's promotion of the new land,
would increase the value of the land retained by the government. Since
the land was expected to more than double in value by the time the
railroad was completed, theoretically the land grants would cost the
government nothing. (See Appendix A for additional information on the
land grant program.) This early aid played a major role in the expan-
sion of railroads into the Midwest, and later into the Far West, and
only a slightly lesser role in the South.
During World War I, the federal government took complete control
of all railroads. In December 1917 it set up policy- and decision-
making headquarters in Washington and opened regional offices to imple-
ment the decisions and actually operate the railroads. Federal con-
trol lasted until March 1920. During that time, railroads were guar-
anteed annual funds equivalent to their average net operating incomes
for the preceding three-year period.
THE PROBLEM WITH RAILROADS TODAY IS . .
Since World War I, railroad profits have generally declined.
The major causes of this decline are: (1) the growth of federal regu-
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lation of railroads through the Interstate Commerce Commission,
which railroad people say has set up rate regulations and abandon-
ment and merger restrictions that have placed unfair burdens on the
railroads, both absolutely and relative to the comparatively unregu-
lated trucks, automobiles, airlines, pipelines, and waterways;
(2) increased competition from the other modes of transportation,
often with federal aid; (3) the inability of railroads to attract
capital, much needed especially to keep operating systems up to date,
and the related problem, peculiar to some midwestern railroads, of
expansion to the West Coast, often unprofitable, creating a burden-
some debt; and (4) the effects of the decline in the power of the
empire builders.
Regulation--The Interstate Commerce Commission
An in-depth study of the Interstate Commerce Commission is
beyond the scope of this paper. A brief outline, though, may be help-
ful.
Government regulation of the railroads began when individual
states in the 1860's and 1870's, reacting to pressure from local
farmers, enacted legislation collectively known as the "Granger Move-
ment." The farmers were upset because the high rates railroad compa-
nies were charging for transporting agricultural goods resulted in
unreasonably high profits. As farmers had no alternative mode of
transportation to get their goods to the market, they were forced to
pay whatever rate the railroads set. In an attempt to alleviate the
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situation, they turned to their state governments. The pressure thus
created resulted in the passage by the Wisconsin State Legislature in
1874 of the Potter Bill, which set maximum first-class passenger
rates at 4 cents a mile and similar rates for other classes and for
freight, all well below current prices. This was the first case in
the United States of government regulation of the railroads. An
injunction by the Wisconsin Supreme Court was needed to compel the
railroads to conform to the new law. They did conform, but in retalia-
tion stopped all new construction and cut back services drastically.
This resulted in almost immediate cessation of economic growth in the
state. Public reaction was so strong that in 1876 a new wave of pro-
railroad politicians was elected, one of the most vocal being Governor
Harrison Lodington, who immediately called for the repeal of the Potter
Bill. The Vance Bill, which effectively repealed the Potter Bill, was
passed that year, quickly ending the powerful, but short-lived, Granger
Movement.
In 1877, the principle of government regulation of railroads was
upheld by the Supreme Court. The first Interstate Commerce Act was
enacted in 1877 to establish the Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC),
but the Commission was empowered only to handle complaints; it had no
power to initiate actions until 1910. The Commission was originally
entitled to regulate only the interstate commerce of railroads and of
combined railroad-waterway traffic. The first regulation of trucks
was put into effect in 1935, the first regulation of waterways in 1940.
In both of these latter cases, however, the ICC regulations were weak,
and still are weak, compared with railroad regulation.
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Airways have been regulated since 1938 by the Civil Aeronautics
Board (CAB). One major difference between the CAB and the ICC,
though, is that the ICC was specifically charged with considering the
effects of its decisions on all forms of transportation, while the
CAB was directed to consider only the welfare of air transportation.
The effect of all these regulations has been to hinder the
ability of the railroads to make a profit, while putting only minor
restrictions on their chief competitors. Specifically, regulations
have prevented the railroads from completing money-saving mergers and
abandoning unprofitable lines and have forced them to offer useful but
unprofitable services. Federal rate-setting has hindered the efforts
by the railroads to reduce rates to compete with other modes of trans-
portation and to raise rates on profitable lines, especially when
sudden increases in traffic would permit extra profit-taking that
would enable them to accumulate sufficient operating capital.
Government regulation has also restricted cooperation among
railroads. Before regulation, competition was occasionally cutthroat,
but more often it was cooperative. Since a few men controlled most of
the railroads, they found it easy to come together and reach agreement
on how to split railroad profits.
The Iowa Pool is one example of these agreements. Three large
railroads, the Burlington & Missouri (part of the Burlington Northern),
the Rock Island, and the Chicago & North Western, all decided to expand
into Iowa in the late 1860's. Competition among the railroads, cutting
severely into the profits of all three railroads, led to the formation
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of the pool in 1869. According to this agreement, the Burlington &
Missouri, the Rock Island, and the Chicago & North Western would each
keep 45 percent of its passenger revenue and 50 percent of its freight
revenue but would put the rest into a pool to be split equally three
ways, thus discouraging competition and encouraging cooperation among
the three lines. This agreement lasted until 1883.
Earlier, on September 1, 1869, Alexander Mitchell, president of
the Chicago, Milwaukee, & St. Paul, had also been elected president of
the Chicago & North Western. Mitchell wanted to combine the two rail-
roads. But backlash resentment caused Mitchell to be voted out of the
Chicago & North Western at the next election, forcing him to drop his
plans to merge the two railroads. Negotiations for a merger have been
held twice since. A merger plan was rejected by the ICC in 1938, and
merger negotiations begun in 1960 collapsed in 1969 when the stock of
the Chicago & North Western fell drastically.
The large railroads also found it easy to work together against
the smaller railroads. Small railroad companies were often formed to
build feeder routes from specific towns to the big railroad lines, or
to expand into territory the big railroads had not yet reached. The
large railroad company would expand by patiently waiting for an adja-
cent line to go bankrupt, sometimes with the help of the successful
railroad, which would then move in and buy the bankrupt line, including
its already-laid track, at a price considerably below the real value of
the new line. (The most common price was probably 10 percent of real
value.) Occasionally the big company would set up and finance a puppet
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company, which would in turn purchase several bankrupt lines. This
policy allowed the big company to have monopoly-like control of rail-
road traffic, while giving the appearance--particularly to state
legislators--that the railroad lines were still locally owned.
This tactic was especially useful for acquiring land grants.
Although lands were granted by the federal government, the actual
administering of the grants, including decisions as to which railroads
received grants, was at the state level. The state legislature, which
rated the grants, usually favored local interests over outside groups
(see, for example, the description on pages 47-48 of this report of the
Burlington & Missouri).
Competition--Alternate Modes of Transportation
With the early development of the internal combustion engine,
trucks actually helped the railroads. Trucks were originally too poorly
designed for long travel, and highways did not exist for long trips.
Trucks served mainly as feeders to the railroad lines, and for this
purpose, they were more efficient than the expensive, rarely used,
feeder railroad lines. Railroads have traditionally lost money on their
feeder lines but have gained it back on their main lines. When trucks
were improved and the road system was constructed in the 1940's, and
especially later, from 1960 to 1975, when the interstate-highway system
was developed, trucks began to make major inroads on railroad freight
traffic. The railroads have also lost freight traffic to waterways,
pipelines, and airlines. As a result of all these factors, railroad
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freight tonnage has remained fairly constant since 1945, with the
expansion in total freight tonnage hauled being absorbed by other
modes of transportation.
Passenger-travel competition has hurt railroads even more.
Railroads have experienced a continuous decline in passenger traffic
since the 1920's, when the automobile became popular. Now, trains have
to compete with buses and airlines as well.
The effectiveness of alternate modes of transportation in
competing with railroads can be seen in Table 1. This table shows
the steady decline of railroad tonnage freight traffic as a percentage
of total traffic from 1940 to 1973 from 61 to 38 percent. Most of
this traffic has been diverted from the railways to motor vehicles
and oil pipelines, while as late as 1973 the airways still carried
an insignificant percentage (0.2 percent) of total traffic. A
trend that should be noted, however, is that the rate of decline
in railroad traffic is also steadily slowing, suggesting that the
overall railroad percentage should soon level off.
An additional word should be added concerning the use of ton-
miles as opposed to tons. Tons of freight shipped represents a
measure of freight shipped, but it is an incomplete picture. The
more useful term, ton-miles, used here, represents a weighted measure.
Tons shipped is multiplied by the miles each ton is shipped, giving
a more accurate account of the transportation involved.
Measurement in ton-miles does have a bias, though, putting more
emphasis on long hauls than on short hauls. The comparative advantage
Table 1
VOLUME OF INTERCITY FREIGHT TRAFFIC BY MODE AND PERCENTAGE DISTRIBUTION, 1926-1973
(Billion Ton Miles)
Total
Intercity Inland Oil
Year Freight Traffic Railroads Motor Vehicles Waterways Pipelines Airways
Percent Percent Percent Percent Percent
Volume Percent Volume of Volume of Volume of Volume of Volume of
Total Total Total Total Total
1926 n.a. 100.0 n.a. 75.4 n.a. 3.9 n.a. 16.8 n.a. 3.7 n.a. n.a.
1936 n.a. 100.0 n.a. 64.6 n.a. 7.7 n.a. 19.6 n.a. 8.0 n.a. n.a.
1940 651 100.0 412 63.2 62 9.5 118 18.1 59 9.1 * 0.002
1945 1,072 100.0 736 68.6 67 6.2 143 13.3 127 11.8 0.1 0.008
1950 1,094 100.0 628 57.4 173 15.8 163 14.9 129 11.8 0.3 0.029
1955 1,298 100.0 655 50.4 223 17.2 217 16.7 203 15.7 0.6 0.037
1960 1,330 100.0 595 44.7 285 21.5 220 16.6 229 17.2 0.8 0.058
1965 1,651 100.0 721 43.7 359 21.8 262 15.9 306 18.6 1.9 0.116
1970 1,936 100.0 771 39.8 412 21.3 319 16.5 431 22.3 3.3 0.170
1973 2,231 100.0 858 38.4 505 22.6 358 16.0 507 22.7 3.9 0.175
n.a. = not available
* = less than 50 million ton miles
NOTE: Percentages may not add due to rounding. Data for the airways are presented with additional detail to show
trends. Inland waterways include Great Lakes shipping.
SOURCE: U.S. Bureau of the Census. Statistical Abstract of the United States, 1975. Washington, D.C.: U.S.
Government Printing Office, 1975, p. 562.
I
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of railroads is in long hauls. So Table 1 has a slight built-in bias
in favor of the railroads.
Railroads were heavily subsidized in the late 19th century but
have been left alone in the 20th century until recently, when finan-
cial aid has been given to selected bankrupt lines, as was noted
earlier. Meanwhile, the U.S. interstate-highway system, which benefits
automobiles and trucks, has been built entirely by federal and state
governments to complement the many roads built by states and localities.
Airways have also received heavy subsidies. From 1925 to 1967,
approximately $11.9 billion had been spent by the federal government
on the establishment, maintenance, and operation of the federal air-
ways system, developed to aid air transport [ 36, Chap. 33]. One
obvious example is the number of publicly owned airports in the country.
The Alaska pipeline is another example of public subsidy of a mode of
transportation that competes with railroads.
Return on Investment
All of the factors mentioned above have cut considerably into the
profit margins of the railroads. Railroads are capital-intensive.
Huge amounts of capital are required to build them, and a continual
flow of capital is required to maintain and modernize them. Yet even
in the good years of the early 1900's railroads returned only a one to
three percent profit on capital investment. This rate is much too low
to attract needed capital. As a result, railroad equipment deteri-
orates, railroad efficiency declines, and railroad profits go down,
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even further reducing the rate of return, thus creating a vicious
cycle. This is the serious problem that most railroads face today.
Table 2 shows the rates of return on investment for railroads
and for four other major modes of transportation (the only major
mode missing is airways) for the years 1958 through 1974. The table
clearly shows that motor carriers (mainly trucks) and pipelines have
had a very healthy return on investment and that inland and ocean-
traveling water carriers have also had a healthy return on investment
except for the recession period of the early 1970's. Meanwhile, the
return on investment for railroads has remained quite low during this
period, reaching its highest point of 3.9 percent in 1966, a figure
still well below the return paid by simply placing money in an ordi-
nary savings account.
During the late 19th century, railroads capitalizing on the
rapid economic growth within the United States, and particularly on
generous railroad grants, reaped large profits. The period from the
turn of the century to World War I saw constant increases in railroad
traffic. But ever-stiffening federal regulations and the end of the
land grant program kept the profits of the railroads fairly low (a
three to six percent return on investment, on the average).
When control was returned to the railroad companies, after
federal control during and immediately following World War I, the
railroad situation was a mess. There were cries of gross government
mismanagement. The accusations were probably well-founded--the
government had not been prepared to handle the task of national con-
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Table 2
RATE OF RETURN, BY MODE, 1958-1974
(Percent)
Year Railroad Motor Carrier Water Carrier a Maritime Carrier Pipeline
1958
1959
1960
1961
1962
1963
1964
1965
1966
1967
1968
1969
1970
1971
1972
1973
1974
2.91
2.85
2.21
2.04
2.77
3.07
3.22
3.73
3.92
2.48
2.52
2.38
1.75
2.17
2.49
2.52
1.74
15.20
20.28
11.53
17.83
19.22
18.53
20.22
22.56
19.47
15.07
21.18
17.23
9.00
17.17
16.28
15.14
11.16
9.87
8.57
8.54
9.68
10.64
13.15
13.38
15.23
14.99
14.04
12.28
8.13
10.02
9.90
10.37
8.62
6.73
5.73
6.44
3.49
4.05
9.04
6.35
9.36
8.10
10.23
8.40
11.00
8.23
5.35
4.29
6.31
3.26
17.67
16.48
17.46
17.01
17.22
17.68
15.85
14.60
15.38
14.84
14.89
13.42
9.90
10.46
10.01
9.91
10.46
9.18
aInland and coastal
NOTE: Return on net investment = net "railway" operating income + net invest-
ment in transportation property and equipment plus working capital.
SOURCE: Interstate. Commerce Commission. Annual Report on the Statistics of
Railways in the United States (1958-1974). U.S. Government Printing
Office, 1959-1975.
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trol. But in a sense, the government was being blamed for a totally
different problem, the general lack of capital (due to the low return
on investment) and its damaging effects, which were just beginning to
be felt.
Most railroads were able to survive in the 1920's, but the
rates of return on investment were so low that they were totally unpre-
pared to weather the storm caused by the Great Depression, which struck
in 1929. The real effect of the Depression on the railroads hit in
the 1930's as other businesses cut back production or simply ceased to
operate. The Chicago & North Western, for example, suffered through a
freight traffic decline from 1929 to 1932 of 18, 25, and 33 percent,
respectively, each year. The late 1930's were not much better, as
maintenance and labor costs began to rise rapidly (and have continued
to rise steadily ever since). In addition, the effect of truck compe-
tition began to be strongly felt in the late 1930's.
World War II was a blessing for the railroads. American involve-
ment in the war brought about a tremendous growth of commodity produc-
tion in the United States, which benefited all modes of transportation.
After the war, the growth of Japan as an industrial power benefited
those railroads that extended to the West Coast. Since the war, rail-
road traffic has remained fairly constant, while costs for everything
the railroads use have gone up. As a result, most railroads are oper-
ating today with a very small profit margin.
The story of the West Coast extensions best emphasizes the
importance of capital investment. Chicago rapidly became a focal point
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for midwestern trade because it was fairly centrally located in the
Midwest and had an already-existing connection to the East by way
of the natural waterways of the Great Lakes and the St. Lawrence
River, aided by the Erie Canal. Many small railroads were built
along sections of this route, mostly to short-cut small sections of
the water route. Eventually these railroads connected to form
several pathways to Chicago from the East. But no eastern railroad
had ventured to build beyond Chicago.
With the growth of world trade of U.S. goods (mostly food
products) in the late 19th century, midwestern businessmen began
looking for faster ways to transport their commodities to port.
Train lines from Chicago southward to the Gulf of Mexico were found
to be slightly faster than the eastern route, but this advantage was
offset by the fact that the warmer climate caused the food products
to spoil more quickly. Since the southern ports served the same
markets as the eastern ports anyway, mostly to Europe, the southern
route failed to gaiu much popularity. One railroad, the Rock Island,
has made a reasonable profit, however, from its southern orientation,
though primarily due to its being unique in its Chicago-South connec-
tions, which include Texas and, indirectly, southern California.
The main alternative to the East Coast ports, however, was,
quite naturally, the West Coast ports. The Union Pacific and
the Central Pacific railroads were the first North American rail-
roads to extend their lines to the West Coast. But because their
lines ran east-west across the middle of the United States, rather
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than near the northern or southern borders, they served all major
market areas without catering specifically to the needs of any one
area. Thus, they were not overly useful to Chicago businessmen.
With the aid of land grants, several businessmen started the
Northern Pacific. They succeeded in building a western route. The
railroad ran short of capital, however, and went bankrupt in 1893.
The bankruptcy was not entirely self-created. James Hill, owner of
the Burlington Northern, was putting together his own northwest
railroad empire. Hill was working with the Canadian Pacific, a
company well financed by the Canadian government, which successfully
built a West Coast extension. But Hill wanted his own western route.
He obtained a huge land grant, which completely paid for the building
of a new West Coast railroad--the Great Northern, which reached the
West Coast in 1893. When the Northern Pacific conveniently went bank-
rupt that same year, Hill moved in and bought the railroad for a
below-market value. Thus Hill was able to own two West Coast exten-
sions, while paying for none of the construction costs! He later
merged these two railroads with several others to form the Burlington
Northern.
Another railroad company, the Milwaukee Road, attempted to
compete with the Burlington Northern by building its own West Coast
extension. The extension was started around 1900. By this time, the
federal government was no longer subsidizing railroads with land
grants, and the Milwaukee Road had to finance the entire cost of the
extension. It had been a very successful railroad and was able to
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raise the capital to pay for the extension. However, the cost so
drained its reserves that it has been in and out of bankruptcy ever
since.
A third railroad, the Rock Island, tried a unique approach to
building a West Coast extension. It built an extension through El
Paso, Texas, to Tucson, Arizona. It then purchased another railroad
line that went from Tucson to San Francisco, thus completing an exten-
sion from Chicago to the West Coast by way of the Southwest. At the
same time, it built trunk lines throughout the Deep South connecting
Chicago and San Francisco with Louisiana, Tennessee, and Arkansas.
This extension quickly drained all of its real assets, and although
the owners of the railroad at the time faked assets to finance
their spending, the deception was soon discovered, and the Rock Island,
too, went bankrupt.
Empire Building
A few rich and powerful men controlled most of the early rail-
roads and most of the affiliated economic activities. One of the
related activities popular with these men was the lumber business.
Locomotives were wood-burning, so the railroads had to buy large
quantities of lumber. Additionally, new railroads sparked new
development, and with it considerable new construction, mostly wooden
farm buildings, with mortgages owned by the railroads themselves.
The empire building of James Hill in putting together the
Burlington Northern has already been recounted. Hill worked closely
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with his financial advisor, J. P. Morgan. In order to control the
Burlington Northern, Hill and Morgan had to out-duel Edward Harriman,
William Rockefeller, and Standard Oil. Harriman controlled the Union
Pacific, and although Standard Oil failed to control the Burlington
Northern, it did manage to control the Milwaukee Road from 1881 until
it went bankrupt in 1925 as a result of the unwise construction of a
western extension. The reason for the economically unfeasible exten-
sion now becomes obvious. Harriman and Rockefeller could not stand
the fact that Hill and Morgan owned a West Coast extension, while
they did not!
The empire builders made it hard for small independent railroads
to survive. The large railroads would intentionally take a big loss
rather than see a small railroad realize a profit. The Soo Line,
for example, was created by a collective of local farmers and busi-
nessmen explicitly to fight against the ruthless practices of the
empire builders, but even the Soo needed outside capital. For a while
several Boston capitalists supported the Soo. But eventually its
owners had to sell out to one of the big railroads, the Canadian
Pacific. The Soo had been successful enough so that the local inter-
ests were able to work out a compromise whereby the Soo would retain
semi-autonomy and would continue to operate in the interest of local
businessmen and farmers.
The growth of Chicago as a midwestern railroad center is attrib-
utable to the work of yet another empire builder. William Butler
Ogden set out to prove that railroads were the future of the Midwest,
- 31 -
and he put together his own railroad empire, the Chicago & North West-
ern.
A brief discussion of each of the five midwestern railroads con-
sidered in the present study, and how the four factors just examined
affected each, follows.
THE CHICAGO & NORTH WESTERN RAILROAD
Empire building at first and competition later on were the two
dominant factors affecting the development of the Chicago & North
Western Railroad. The Chicago & North Western empire was put together
by the first of the great midwestern empire builders, William Butler
Ogden. Ogden used all of the tricks of empire builders to expand his
railroad into a mighty empire. Even after he retired in 1868, the
railroad continued to expand rapidly until it reached its peak in 1911.
Empire building thus dominated the early history of the Chicago &
North Western.
By the late 1800's, the Chicago & North Western was fighting
against stiff competition from other midwestern railroads. During the
1900's, the railroad's freight traffic has suffered as a result of com-
petition from alternative modes of transportation as well. The effects
of competition have been the major theme of its recent economic history.
But its history rightfully starts with the beginning of railroad con-
struction in the Midwest.
In Europe and the eastern United States, trade patterns were
established before trains were invented. When railroad lines were
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finally built in the eastern United States, they followed the already-
established trade routes. But the Midwest and the West were still
undeveloped when railroads reached the United States. The Midwest
was limited mostly to subsistence farming, with some small trade from
hunting and mining. When the farmers reaped a surplus, they had no
efficient way to transport their goods to the eastern markets. The
only trade routes available were two waterways, the Mississippi River
and its tributaries, which run south, and the Great Lakes, which run
northeast. As a result, development occurred only in these restricted
areas. The maps in Appendix B show this early railroad development.
A few enterprising men saw the railroad as a means of expanding
agricultural development in the rich farmlands of the Midwest. William
Ogden was the first to try out this new idea.
Ogden--The Empire Builder
Ogden built the first midwestern railroad, the Galena & Chicago
Union Railroad. Shortly afterward, he put together the Chicago &
North Western railway system, expanding mainly by buying up bankrupt
and other financially troubled lines. Ogden added to his empire by
becoming involved in many related fields. At one point he owned a
major portion of the midwestern lumber business--a business on which
railroads depended greatly for fuel and for construction related to
economic development. Ogden's interests were so varied that he could
not even keep his attention focussed on one empire. For example, in
1862 he was elected president of the Union Pacific Railroad. But his
empire really began in Chicago.
- 33 -
Several small trade centers had grown up along the Great Lakes.
One of them, Chicago, which was incorporated as a city in 1837,
elected Ogden its first mayor. Ogden set out to prove that a rail-
road network feeding the trade center of Chicago was economically
feasible for the railroads and for Chicago. But Chicagoans strongly
opposed the idea. They believed a railroad would destroy their city:
farmers would stop coming into the city, thus ruining trade; and rival
cities would build up along the railroad line. They wanted to con-
tinue transporting freight by the Great Lakes and the network of
plank roads then in existence, which were constructed by merely nail-
ing planks to timbers placed on the ground. (By 1848, two hundred
wagons a day were entering the city on the plank-road network.)
Ogden and his associates worked for ten years to get a railroad
charter and financial support. When it became apparent that they
were not going to get a new charter, they bought the rights to an old
one. Ogden was not concerned about where he built his railroad as
long as it was built. The charter he purchased was for a railroad to
travel between the lead mines of Galena, Illinois, and Chicago. But
before construction began, the organization formed to build the rail-
road went bankrupt, and a reorganization was necessary. On April 5,
1848, the first annual meeting of the reorganized Galena & Chicago
Union Railroad was held. Total financing from stock sales, mostly to
local farmers, amounted to $351,800. The directors voted to begin
construction immediately between Chicago and the Des Plaines River,
eight miles away. Upon completion of this segment, a 31-mile exten-
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sion to the town of Elgin was to be built. Future plans called for
the final extension 143 miles to Galena, a total distance from
Chicago of 182 miles.
In November of 1848, the revitalized line opened, and the
first train traveled the eight-mile distance from the Des Plaines
River to Chicago. Although the first run was intended just to carry
railroad officials, the officials persuaded a farmer headed for
Chicago with a wagonload of wheat to let the railroad carry his
wheat for him, provided he was allowed to ride along with his wheat.
The train traveled only to the Chicago city limits, because the down-
town merchants, still opposed to the idea of a railroad, had voted to
ban all railroads from the city. However, when they learned a week
later that 30 more carloads of wheat were already waiting at the Des
Plaines depot for transportation to Chicago, the merchants quickly
changed their stance. Ogden had finally convinced the merchants that
the railroads were the future for Chicago.
In its first year of operation, the Galena & Chicago Union
Railroad earned over $2,000 a month. The railroad kept expanding--to
Elgin in 1850, to Cherry Valley in 1852, and to Freeport in 1853. But
it never built out to Galena. The final extension from Freeport to
Galena, completed on October 30, 1854, was built by the Illinois
Central, one of the many railroads that were quickly built after the
Galena & Chicago became successful. By 1857, the Galena & Chicago
had 56 locomotives, 1,200 freight and passenger cars, and 260 miles of
road.
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Meanwhile, Ogden, realizing that the many railroads being
built west of Chicago all depended on wood supplies, was buying up
as much of the lumber business as he could, building a foundation
for his railroad empire. There were accusations of his using his
railroad position to benefit himself. In the summer of 1848, he
offered to resign, but the majority of the directors objected. With
continued protest, he finally did resign, on June 5, 1851. Thirteen
years later he was to buy the Galena & Chicago Union Railroad and
merge it with another of his railroads, the Chicago & North Western.
After leaving the Galena & Chicago, Ogden went looking for
another railroad with which to build his dream empire. The Madison
& Beloit Railroad of Wisconsin attracted his attention when the
Galena & Chicago made a connection with the Madison & Beloit in 1854.
Ogden was shrewd. He patiently waited for the right moment to make
his move, but he continued to cherish his dream of owning a huge rail-
road running throughout the Midwest, a dream that was to become a
reality. Sure enough, the Madison & Beloit, after some unwise expan-
sion and a name change to the Chicago, St. Paul, & Fond du Lac Rail-
road, defaulted in the panic of 1857. Ogden moved in, bought the
railroad in 1858, and renamed it the Chicago & North Western Railroad.
Expansion into Minnesota followed the same pattern. Railroad
construction in Minnesota had been a disaster. Despite a land grant
of over 6 million acres in 1857, and a state loan of $5 million in
1858, the first railroad line was not completed until 1866. Follow-
ing the Civil War, many Minnesota railroads were built, but most were
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financial failures. The Chicago & North Western, seizing its oppor-
tunity, formed a puppet company, the Chicago, St. Paul, Minneapolis,
& Omaha Railroad, which bought up at artificially low prices the many
bankrupt Minnesota lines. The Chicago & North Western moved into
Wisconsin by first leasing, in 1866, then later, in 1883, purchasing,
the financially troubled Milwaukee & Chicago Railroad, built primar-
ily to provide service between the two cities.
Another large railroad, the Chicago, Milwaukee, & St. Paul,
later nicknamed the Milwaukee Road, was being extended into the same
areas as the Chicago & North Western. Expansion competition was
relatively peaceful in the 1860's. The late 1860's and early 1870's
saw the holdings of both of these companies being consolidated in
Illinois, Wisconsin, and Iowa, and there were mergers of many small
railroads with larger ones. One reason for the slow expansion during
this period was the growing resentment of farmers to high railroad
profits, which culminated in the Granger Movement.4
Competition
By this time, William Ogden had phased out most of his involve-
ment in the Chicago & North Western. But the railroad's directors,
feeling pressure from competitors, continued to expand operations.
Competition became the main theme of the railroad's history.
3The Chicago, St. Paul, Minneapolis, & Omaha Railroad is com-
pletely controlled by the Chicago & North Western but has never been
purchased outright.
4For a discussion of the Granger Movement, see pages 16-17.
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In the late 1870's, competition between the Chicago & North
Western and the Milwaukee Road increased. Both companies extended
their lines rapidly through Minnesota to get at the rich undeveloped
farmlands of the Dakotas. Both reached the Missouri River in South
Dakota in 1880. They were forced to stop there, as all land west of
the river belonged to the Sioux Indian Reservation. The U.S. govern-
ment was protecting the Reservation boundaries at the time, mainly
because it had no reason not to protect them. The richness of the
farmlands had yet to be proven by the railroads, but on July 27,
1874, gold was discovered in the Black Hills, a large mountain range
in South Dakota. In 1890, reacting to pressure, the government
started making plans to open up the Reservation. Limited new settle-
ment was legalized in 1902, with all restrictions removed in 1904.
The Chicago & North Western and the Milwaukee Road both followed the
gold boom into the Dakotas. Meanwhile, the Chicago & North Western
entered Wyoming in 1886. There were good markets almost immediately
in livestock, coal, and oil, and the company was ready to profit from
the oil boom of 1895-1920.
Entering the 20th century, Chicago & North Western expansion
was slowed sharply as the huge profit margins began to disappear.
The Chicago & North Western managed to stay in good shape, however,
until the federal government took control during World War I. The
railroad showed only modest profits in the 1920's and was in no
position to weather the Great Depression that struck in 1929. A
major drought in the middle 1930's further reduced grain traffic.
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(Grain traffic represented 11 percent of total freight traffic in 1930,
15 percent in 1933, and 10 percent in 1935 [ 9 ].) The once mighty
Chicago & North Western filed for reorganization, claiming bankruptcy,
on June 28, 1935. It was put into federal receivership until March 1,
1945, when it was again able to operate at a profit.
During World War II, a huge increase occurred in all railroad
traffic. The government had learned a lesson from its experience in
controlling the railroads during World War I and this time left them
alone. The Chicago & North Western was in a particularly favorable
position because of the excellent management provided by Rowland
Williams, who had become its president in 1939. Williams was a realist.
He reviewed and eliminated a considerable amount of track on minor lines
that could no longer compete with trucks and cars. He exploited the
advantages of the very successful high-speed railroad passenger service,
one of the few remaining areas where the railroad had the advantage.
The only line to show a continual profit during reorganization had been
the Twin City run by the '400' engines. This run, begun in 1935,
covered the 400 miles between St.Paul-Minneapolis and Chicago in 400
minutes (hence the nickname '400').
Today, the Chicago & North Western Railroad operates 10,236
miles of road, serving the region west of Lake Michigan and south of
Lake Superior: Illinois, Iowa, South Dakota, Missouri, Wisconsin,
Nebraska, Michigan, Kansas, Minnesota, North Dakota, and Wyoming.
Lines reach from Chicago to Milwaukee, Minneapolis-St. Paul, and Omaha,
connecting with the Union Pacific, thus forming a part of the trans-
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continental route to the Pacific Coast. Traffic is light except on
the main lines. The lines serve the industrial, forest, agricultural,
dairying, and livestock sections of the Northwest and Midwest (includ-
ing the important ports of Lake Michigan and Lake Superior), the iron
ore ranges of the upper peninsula of Michigan, and a coal field known
as the Springfield District of Illinois.
The next pages contain maps of the Chicago & North Western from
its start as the Galena & Chicago in 1850 right up to the Chicago &
North Western Railroad network of today. They show the early rapid
expansion of empire building, which reaped large profits for the rail-
road. When expansion slowed in the early 1900's, profits declined.
The problems of low return on investment and, mainly, the effect of
competition from alternate transportation modes have kept the company
only marginally profitable since. However, a solid financial base,
due partly to the fact that the railroad has never attempted to build
a West Coast extension, has kept it out of bankruptcy except for the
duration of the Great Depression.
THE BURLINGTON NORTHERN RAILROAD
The Burlington Northern owes its financial strength to the fact
that it has not one, but three extensions to the West Coast. All
three were constructed with large land grants during the period when
the federal government was aiding railroads, thus incurring no burden-
some debt. The existence of a West Coast extension, without a debt
(that is, the lack of a serious problem related to return on investment),
has been a major factor in the success of the Burlington Northern.
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Figure 1-A.
The Galena & Chicago Union Railroad, 1850
(Figure 1-B shows the railroad just
before consolidation with the Chicago &
North Western.)
(Figure 1-C shows the railroad just
before consolidation with the Galena &
Chicago Union Railroad.)
Figure 1-B.
The Calena & Chicago Union Railroad, 1864
The Chicago & North Western Railroad, 1864
Figure 1. Origin of the Chicago & North Western Railroad
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Figure 2. Development of the Chicago & North Western Railroad, 1870
Figure 3. Development of the Chicago & North Western Railroad, 1880
(Note: Dotted lines show the Chicago, St. Paul, Kinneapolis, & Omaha Railroad, a privately
owned railroad leased to the Chicago & North Western for 999 years.)
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Figure 4. Development of the Chicago & North Western Railroad, 1900
Figure 5. Development of the Chicago & North Western Railroad, 1930
(Note: Dotted lines show the Chicago, St. Paul, Minneapolis, & Omaha Railroad, a privately
owned railroad leased to the Chicago & North Western for 999 years.)
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The Chicago & North Western Railroad, 1976Figure 6.
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The other major factor in the development of the Burlington
Northern was the empire building of James Hill. Hill, another of the
great empire builders, built a northwestern railroad, the Great Northern,
which connected the Chicago railroad network with the West Coast.
Through typically ruthless empire building, Hill was able to purchase
two other northwestern railroads, the Northern Pacific and the
Pacific Coast.
After acquiring these three railroads, Hill went after the
Chicago, Burlington, & Quincy, a midwestern railroad serving mainly
as a feeder into Chicago. When Hill gained full control of the
Chicago, Burlington, & Quincy, in 1901, fighting off a bid by Standard
Oil, the Burlington Northern system was formed.
Hill--The Empire Builder
James Hill began to put together his northern railroad empire
in 1878 by purchasing the financially troubled St. Paul & Pacific
Railroad and renaming it the St. Paul, Minneapolis, & Manitoba. Wise
expansion, combined with several years of bumper grain crops, which
also spurred rapid economic growth in the region, turned the railroad
into a profitable line.
Hill was also involved in the transcontinental Canadian Pacific
Railroad being built at this time, serving as its director until
his resignation in 1883, after which he continued to serve as an
advisor. He wanted to extend the St. Paul, Minneapolis, & Manitoba
to the Pacific Coast. Four railroads already stretched to the West
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Coast, three in the United States--the Union Pacific, the Central
Pacific, and the Northern Pacific, and one in Canada--the just
completed Canadian Pacific. Hill went out of his way to avoid
competing with the Canadian Pacific, built by his friends, and the
Northern Pacific, which he hoped eventually to purchase. He was
convinced that the Northern Pacific would be for sale soon. The
St. Paul, Minneapolis, & Manitoba expanded through the Dakotas and
Montana and finally, in 1893, to the Puget Sound, on the Pacific
Coast. In 1890, the name of the road was changed to the Great Northern.
As it turned out, Hill had been right about the Northern
Pacific. First, a major scandal shook it; then in the panic year of
1893, it went bankrupt. (It was a bad year for railroads: the
Santa Fe and the Union Pacific both went bankrupt as well.) The
directors of the Great Northern moved in to buy the Northern Pacific.
But the move was blocked in court under a law prohibiting the
unification of parallel and competing railroads. So Hill and his
associates, as private individuals, purchased it.
The Great Northern carried mainly lumber. Since Chicago
represented the clearing house for the major lumber market, the
Midwest, Hill sought a connection into Chicago. He found one in the
Chicago, Burlington, & Quincy Railroad. Joining forces with his
financial assistant, J. P. Morgan, Hill was able to out-maneuver
Edward Henry Harriman, then head of the Union Pacific, who also wanted
the Chicago, Burlington, & Quincy. The purchase was made April 17,
1901.
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Hill was thus able to establish his eastward lumber trade.
To develop a westward trade, Hill's agents persuaded Japanese
textile millers to purchase long-stapled American cotton to mix with
the short-stapled cotton they were buying from India. The American
cotton was shipped north from New Orleans, on to the Hill lines, and
out to Seattle for shipment to Japan. Markets also opened up for
Minnesota flour and New England cotton goods, both of which sold
well in China.
To complement its trade pattern, the Burlington system in 1908
purchased 1,800 miles of line previously operated by the Colorado &
Southern Railway. The transaction brought through lines from
Cheyenne and Denver, southward to Fort Worth, Dallas, Houston, and
Galveston, providing for a new short route from the Pacific Northwest
to the Gulf.
Expansion Through the Midwest
The Chicago, Burlington, & Quincy Railroad was itself put together
from several smaller lines. One of these, the Aurora Branch Railroad,
was built in 1849 by the townspeople of Aurora, Illinois, to connect
the city to the prospering Galena & Chicago. At that time, there
were numerous half-built, now bankrupt, railroad lines in Michigan.
Two ambitious young men, James Frederick Jay and John W. Brooks,
backed by financial support from Boston's John Murray Forbes, another
of the empire builders, bought a number of these railroads from the
State of Michigan and organized them into the Michigan Central Railroad.
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The line extended through Michigan to Lake Michigan, where water
routes were available to Chicago and to the West, and to various
eastern railroads. But the Michigan Southern, a competing railroad
company, built directly to Chicago, so the Michigan Central did so as
well.
After connecting with Chicago, the directors of the Michigan
Central began looking for ways to expand into Illinois. They found
one in 1852 when the directors of the Aurora Branch Railroad and
the Central Military Tract, an Illinois railroad chartered but not yet
I
built, decided to join forces and built a line from Chicago through
Illinois to Burlington, Iowa. But they needed additional financing.
The stockholders of the Michigan Central offered their support, and
the three companies began a working relationship that eventually
led to a merger. When the Aurora Branch reached Burlington, the
name was changed to the Chicago, Burlington, & Quincy Railroad
Company.
Expansion into Iowa took place in a similar fashion. The
Michigan Central officials, eyeing a possible sizeable land grant,
gave financial backing to a group from Iowa to build the Burlington &
Missouri River Railroad. The Burlington & Missouri was awarded a
land grant in 1856.
By 1864, the Burlington & Missouri planned expansion into
Nebraska and pressured Congress for a new land grant. The grant
allowed the company ten square miles on alternate sections, within a
twenty-mile strip on either side of the proposed track. A separate
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company, the Burlington & Missouri Railroad of Nebraska, was formed to
receive the grant. The same group of investors, now headed by John
Forbes, who was gradually expanding his control by new stock purchases,
owned all of the railroads mentioned--the Burlington & Missouri Railroad
of Nebraska; the Burlington & Missouri of Iowa; the Chicago, Burlington, &
Quincy; and the Michigan Central.
The 1870's brought consolidation of the three other railroads
into the Chicago, Burlington, & Quincy. In one case, the directors of
the Chicago, Burlington, & Quincy and the directors of the Burlington &
Missouri of Iowa voted to lease on a perpetual basis the Burlington &
Missouri to the Chicago, Burlington, & Quincy, with outright purchase
to take place as soon as all stock transactions could be completed.
Six of the twelve Chicago, Burlington,& Quincy's directors served on
the Burlington & Missouri's board!
Current Situation
Although a merger agreement was under negotiation throughout
the 20th century and the Burlington Northern Railroad network operated
as if it consisted of one railroad company, a formal merger did not
take place until March 2, 1970, when the Northern Pacific Railway
Company; the Great Northern Railway Company; the Chicago, Burlington, &
Quincy Railroad Company; and the Pacific Coast Railroad Company
formally became the Burlington Northern Railroad Company.
Today, the Burlington operates 14,581 miles of main line, and
10,712 miles of branch lines, carrying principally agricultural products,
timber, and iron ore.
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The Burlington Northern is one of the few railroads in the
United States, and the only railroad discussed in this report, not to
have experienced bankruptcy on any of its main lines. This is due
mainly to its strong position of being both a major midwestern railroad
and a major northwestern railroad, allowing it to take advantage of the
economic dependence of these two regions on each other. The Burlington
was able to enter this position by expanding early with substantial
federal aid (through land grants), thus avoiding the creation of a
serious debt structure. The Burlington was also, for many years, the
only midwestern railroad with a West Coast extension, and today still
represents the main connection between Chicago and the Pacific Ocean,
as shown in Figure 7. The lack of debt is crucial.
The next two railroads to be discussed in this report, the
Milwaukee Road, and the Rock Island Line, both are in weak economic
condition due mainly to the large debt they incurred while trying to
build West Coast extensions.
THE MILWAUKEE ROAD
Three of the four factors discussed in the third section played
a major role in the development of the Milwaukee Road: empire building,
West Coast extension (low rate of return on investment), and competition.
The Milwaukee Road began as a successful small-scale railroad. It
quickly attracted the attention, and came under the control, of Standard
Oil (represented by Rockefeller, Harriman, and Stillman) , which in
addition to its other activities, engaged in extensive railroad empire
building.
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To compete with James Hill's Burlington Northern empire, the
Milwaukee Road built its own West Coast extension. The move was an
economic disaster and created a burdensome debt structure, which
pushed it into bankruptcy shortly after World War I. Although the
railroad became financially sound during World War II, competition
from other railroads, particularly the Burlington Northern, with its
West Coast extensions, and from alternate forms of transportation,
particularly trucks, has kept the Road's rate of return on investment
very low.
Enter the Empire Builders
The Milwaukee Road, which had been chartered in 1863 as the
Milwaukee & St. Paul Railway, grew out of a general need for efficient
transportation in Wisconsin. Rather than build its own lines, it
bought the bankrupt Milwaukee & Prairie du Chien Railway. It was well
financed by various Wall Street investors, and prospered under expansion.
In the 1880's the railroad expanded into Illinois, the Dakotas, and
Missouri, and received land grants to expand into Iowa and Minnesota.
In 1881, William Rockefeller became a director of the Milwaukee
Road. Thus began the feud between the J. P. Morgan-James Hill and
Standard Oil interests over control of the northwestern railroads,
including the Milwaukee Road, which remained under the control of
Standard Oil until the Road went bankrupt in 1925.
West Coast Extension
Around the turn of the century, the directors of the Milwaukee
Road felt a need to expand to the West Coast to compete with Hill's
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Burlington route. Although railroad land grants were no longer
available, they were convinced that the expansion would pay for itself
by serving as a feeder line and increasing traffic on the main line.
Original cost estimates of the western route through the Dakotas, Montana,
Idaho, and Washington to the Pacific Coast were $70 million, but actual
construction costs ran to $234 million. These costs should be compared
with those of the Northern Pacific, which had cost $70 million. The
comparison is not entirely valid, however, as the Northern Pacific
had received 44 million acres of land grants to help offset its construc-
tion cost.
Rising costs, interest payments on the huge debt resulting
from the West Coast extension, and the failure of anticipated traffic
to materialize, forced the Milwaukee Road to file for bankruptcy on
March 17, 1925. The Road was sold to the only bidder for $140 million
on November 22, 1926, and was reorganized as the Chicago, Milwaukee,
St. Paul, & Pacific Railroad (still its official name). The efforts
to resurrect it came at a very poor time. The Great Depression hit
the railroad late in 1929, only three years after the new owners had
taken over. It went bankrupt again in 1935, and stayed in bankruptcy
until the prosperity of the World War II period allowed it to reorganize
again in 1945.
Competition
Revenues began dropping shortly after the war and have continued
to decline. The Milwaukee Road has been particularly hard hit by
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competition from trucks and cars. Only the industrial growth of Japan
in the 1960's, creating long-haul traffic from the Pacific to the
Midwest, has kept it out of another bankruptcy.
Today, the Milwaukee Road operates 5,594 miles of main
and 9,447 miles of branch lines for a total track mileage of 15,041,
as shown in the map on the following page. The road is principally
a common carrier of freight, serving the Midwest and the northern tier
of the Pacific Northwest states. It extends east of the traditional
break point of Chicago to reach important connections to the East and
Southeast at Louisville, Kentucky. The road reaches foreign markets
through the Great Lakes and Pacific Coast ports, and also through a
connection with the Canadian railroads at Sumas, Washington.
The Milwaukee Road also offers commuter service between Chicago
and its western and northern suburbs, and intercity passenger service
between Chicago, Milwaukee, and the Twin Cities under contract to
Amtrak (as of May 1, 1971).
The Milwaukee Road began the 20th century with a burdensome debt
structure resulting from its West Coast extension. Fierce competition,
added to the problems resulting from a low rate of return on investment,
has kept it only marginally profitable.
THE ROCK ISLAND LINE
Competition and a low rate of return on investment have kept
the Rock Island Line in and out of bankruptcy. The railroad started
out with conservative expansion and prospered. A shift to reckless
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expansion, including an attempted extension to the West Coast by way
of a winding southern route, resulted in bankruptcy just before the
Depression. Although the line recovered nicely during World War II,
it has not done well since and is presently bankrupt.
Competition
As part of the railroad boom in Illinois, the original Rock
Island Railroad was planned as a connection between Rock Island and
LaSalle, Illinois. A charter was obtained in 1847. Expansion to
Chicago and reorganization as the Chicago & Rock Island Rail Road
(sic) took place in 1854. Expansion into Iowa and a final name-change
to the Chicago, Rock Island, & Pacific Railroad occurred respectively
in 1865 and 1866, after the financially troubled Mississippi & Missouri
Railroad gave up and sold out to the Rock Island. The Rock Island
continued expansion to Kansas City, through Missouri and Kansas.
During the period 1893 to 1901, the railroads in competition with
the Rock Island, including the Burlington Northern, were reaping large
profits from their lines extending to the West Coast. The Rock Island
had no West Coast extension and suffered financially from this lack; it
was losing business to its competition, because it could only ship
part way to the West Coast. But building an extension at this time
would have been prohibitively expensive. So it looked for an alternate
solution to the problem. In 1883, it tried a working agreement to ship
its railroad cars to the West Coast on the Union Pacific tracks, but
this agreement soon became meaningless. In order to get the original
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agreement, the Rock Island had to allow the Milwaukee Road and the
Chicago & North Western Railroad to join in. The Rock Island could not
get an advantage over its competitors if they all shared the same
advantage. The situation became worse when several smaller lines joined
in the agreement in 1884. When the Union Pacific had financial problems,
the Rock Island decided it had to have its own extension to the West Coast.
Meanwhile, the line was expanding into Nebraska, Kansas, Colorado,
and Oklahoma. This suggested the possibility of a southern route to the
West Coast.
The Reid-Moore syndicate, a group of four men, Bill Leeds,
Dan Reid, and William and James Moore, aggressive, shady, and good at
hiding illegal financial manipulations, gained control of the Rock
Island in 1901.
In 1902, the Rock Island leased for 999 years the 1,289-mile
Burlington, Cedar Rapids, & Northern Railroad, extending Rock Island
service into Minnesota to St. Paul and Minneapolis. By construction
and syndicate purchase of the St. Louis & San Francisco Railroad, the
Rock Island was able to offer, in 1902, through-service from Chicago
to Los Angeles by way of El Paso, Texas, New Mexico, and Tucson,
Arizona. Expansion continued in 1903 farther into Texas, in 1904
into Arkansas to Memphis, Tennessee, and into Missouri to St. Louis, and
in 1905 into Louisiana.
Rate of Return on Investment
Meanwhile, the Rock Island debt increased to $275 million.
Although the railroad's gross revenues were expanding rapidly ($45 million
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in 1904 to $61 million in 1909), its burdensome debt structure put it
into the red. The members of the syndicate managed to cover this up
from the time of their purchase of the road in 1901 to 1914, when
court decisions against many of their holding companies began to break
up their complicated financial structure. In 1915, the syndicate lost
control of the railroad, which almost immediately declared bankruptcy.
The debt structure and stock structure were cleaned up and reorganized
and the railroad was released from receivership in 1917. The companies
that had been formed illegally by the syndicate to hide the growing
debt were all forced to default. But none of the debts incurred by
the railroad itself were defaulted.
In 1921, the oil boom hit Texas and Arkansas. The Rock Island
captured most of the new oil traffic. Poor business management, however,
combined with the Depression to put the railroad into bankruptcy again.
Despite dwindling revenues, it continued to pay dividends through 1931.
In 1930, it attempted to purchase controlling stock once again in the
St. Louis & San Francisco Railroad, with the intention of forcing a
merger. (The Rock Island stock had been lost when the syndicate was
forcibly broken up.) On June 7, 1933, bankruptcy was declared. Reor-
ganization plans were indefinitely postponed since revenues were
ridiculously low compared with the outstanding debt, but revenues were
expected to increase in the future.
In 1935, the courts appointed Ned Durham president of the Rock
Island. Durham hired John Farrington as his operating officer. Together,
they reorganized and modernized the running of the Rock Island. Their
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good management, together with the general prosperity of railroads
during World War II, led to bankruptcy reorganization and an end to
court jurisdiction in 1947. (The successes of Farrington and Durham
were highly praised, particularly in an article entitled "Rock Island
Revived" in the December 1944 issue of Fortune Magazine.)
The Rock Island today covers 7,385 miles in 13 states, principally
Iowa, Illinois, Minnesota, Kansas, Missouri, Oklahoma, Colorado,
Arkansas, and Texas, as shown by the map on the next page. Problems
common to all railroads, including the two primary factors already
mentioned--increased competition from alternate forms of transportation
and low return on investment resulting in low capitalization--have
recently taken their toll. The Rock Island declared bankruptcy again
on March 17, 1975.
THE SOO LINE
The nickname, "the Soo," has traditionally referred to the
Minneapolis, St. Paul, & Sault Ste. Marie Railroad. In 1961, that
railroad merged with the Wisconsin Central Railroad and the Duluth,
South Shore, & Atlantic Railroad. The newly merged railroad formally
adopted the name "Soo Line Railroad."
The Soo Line, by reacting effectively to the potential problems
of empire building, West Coast extensions, and competition, is presently
in an excellent financial condition. As previously mentioned, it was
one of the few lines successfully built without the help of, and in
fact in opposition to, the large financial interests of the empire builders.
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By avoiding the attempted construction of a West Coast route, it has
remained financially stable. But even the Soo Line had to make some
concessions to outside investors.
Fighting the Empire Builders
Minnesota and North and South Dakota have excellent land for
growing hard spring wheat, yet before 1880 there was no market for
this type of wheat, because the wheat mills could not process the hard
grains. In the 1880's, technology improved, and the wheat mills of
Minneapolis started accepting hard wheat. At the same time, a large
market for Minneapolis flour developed in Europe, causing an increased
demand for wheat.
But the Chicago railroads were unfriendly to the Minneapolis
mills. They charged exorbitant rates and insisted that the flour be
shipped through Chicago. As a result, several small railroads, backed
by Minneapolis millers seeking independent routes east, were built
from Minneapolis to Duluth, where, during the summer, wheat could be
shipped east on the Great Lakes. The Chicago railroad interests
disliked this new threat to their monopoly. They (the Rock Island
and the Northern Pacific in particular) bought up these small new
railroads. In the 1880's, while James Hill was advising on the
construction of the Canadian Pacific, which built many feeder lines into
the United States, Hill (with Chicago interests himself) made sure the
Canadian Pacific stayed clear of the non-Chicago shipping routes.
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A strong independent railroad was necessary. In 1933, a large
group of Minneapolis businessmen built the Minneapolis, Sault Ste.
Marie, & Atlantic Railway. This was done with private funding--without
land grants. The railroad successfully solved the problem of getting
the flour east from Minneapolis.
To fight this new railroad, Hill started buying up wheat from
the farms and shipping it on his Northern lines directly to Duluth,
by-passing Minneapolis. The wheat was then loaded directly onto
Hill's Great Lakes steamers. So the Minneapolis & Pacific Railway
was organized in 1888 by Minneapolis interests to compete with Hill
in collecting wheat from the farms.
Consolidation--The Minneapolis, St. Paul, &
Sault Ste. Marie Railroad
The Minneapolis railroads were in need of financing. They got
it from the Canadian Pacific in return for two concessions: the
Canadian Pacific was to receive stock control in the new railroad (just
over 50 percent interest), and a major consolidation of the Minneapolis-
area railroads was to take place. On June 11, 1888, the Minneapolis &
Pacific; the Minneapolis, Sault Ste. Marie, & Atlantic; the Minneapolis &
St. Croix; and the Aberdeen, Bismarck, & Northwestern were consolidated
into the Minneapolis, St. Paul, & Sault Ste. Marie Railroad. This new
railroad extended from the wheat lands of Minnesota and the Dakotas
(with some mining--particularly coal) to the Great Lakes ports of
Wisconsin, with their connections east.
The Soo Line was hurt by the Depression, going bankrupt in 1937,
and reorganizing with the general improvement in the economy in 1944.
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The Wisconsin Central Railroad
The Wisconsin Central Railroad was formed in 1897. It
expanded, acquiring other lines, but stayed within Wisconsin. Like
many other small railroads, it went bankrupt early in the Depression,
in 1932, and stayed in receivership until 1954. While the Wisconsin
Central was in receivership, the Milwaukee, St. Paul, & Sault Ste.
Marie acted as agent of the federal receiver. Traffic is mainly
industrial, coal and iron-ore mining, and diversified manufacturing
(the largest single element is lumber, shingles, and lathes, with
9 percent of the traffic).
The Duluth, South Shore, and Atlantic Railway
The Duluth, South Shore, & Atlantic Railway was formed in 1887
as a consolidation of several small mining railroads. Traffic today
is increasingly made up of forest products and miscellaneous manu-
facturing; mining freight is steadily declining.
The Merger
On January 1, 1961, these three railroads merged into the Soo
Line Railroad Company. At present the Canadian Pacific owns 56 percent
of the voting stock of the Soo. The Soo operates 4,588 miles of road,
serving northern Michigan, Wisconsin, Minnesota, North Dakota, eastern
Montana, northern South Dakota, and northern Illinois. (See map on
page 64.) It serves very few large cities, and none exclusively, so
the line has never depended on large passenger-traffic revenue. For
that reason, it has been considerably less hurt by the advances of the
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automobile than its neighbors, the Northern Pacific and the Great
Northern. Passenger service on the Soo was slowly phased out and was
discontinued completely in 1967.
Since the merger of 1961, extensive and efficient use of
computers and a revised rate and service system (taking into account
those commodities and routes where the railroad competes directly with
trucks) have kept the Soo profitable. In fact, at the beginning of
the 1970's, the Soo's freight tonnage was slowly but steadily increasing.
At a time when many railroads have succumbed to the increased
competition, mainly from trucks, and to low capital investment due to
a low rate of return on investment, the Soo has faced these problems
and overcome them. This must be taken as a hopeful sign for the future
of midwestern railroads. Midwestern railroads may someday once again
become generally prosperous.
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LAND GRANTS
This appendix attempts to show the tremendous magnitude of the
land grant program. The map on the next page shows the land areas of
the country granted to the railroads by the United States government.
The shaded areas of the map represent regions within which railroads
received large areas of lands, usually in alternate sections. The actual
amount of land granted is a subject of dispute. One author, Robert Selph
Henry, in his magazine article, "The Railroad Land Grant Legend in
American History Texts" [26], written in 1945, presents two maps, one of
which he states represents the exaggerated common belief concerning the
extent of land grants and the other being his conception of the actual
lands granted. His view was quickly challenged in 1946 by David Ellis
and others in their article, "Comments on 'The Railroad Land Grant Legend
in American History Texts"' [17]. In this article, some of the authors
present reasons why Henry's estimates are too conservative while others
maintain they are too generous. The map on page 67 is from the U.S.
Department of the Interior, Information Bulletin [60]. This map,
by showing only the general areas where lands were granted, presents
the most accurate graphical description possible of land grants.
To provide a better idea of what land grants meant to individual
railroads, Tables A-1 and A-2 are presented. These tables show the actual
cash flow resulting to two railroads from the sales of land grants. Note
that the cash sales are given in actual money of that time. They are
not adjusted to current dollars. Therefore, the cash sales are, in most
cases, worth even more than they at first appear to be worth in relation
to other prices of their day.
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Table A-l
GROSS LAND SALES BY THE CHICAGO, ROCK ISLAND, & PACIFIC RAILWAY AND
AVERAGE PRICE PER ACRE OF LANDS SOLD, ANNUALLY, 1871-1883
Acres Sold
28,022
13,964
15,592
24,538
35,787
67,380
21,532
12,961
21,348
86,860
94,453
64,078
27,307
12,851
Value
$213,575
107,693
126,779
200,152
287,032
532,961
178,596
108,663
183,455
747,691
781,261
617,935
278,513
123,795
Average Price
Per Acre
$ 7.63
7.75
8.10
8.20
8.00
7.90
8.29
8.30
8.59
8.60
8.27
9.64
10.19
9.63
SOURCE: Richard Cleghorn Overton. Burlington West: A Colonization
History of the Burlington Railroad. Cambridge, Massachusetts:
Harvard University Press, 1967, p. 531.
Year
1871
1872
1873
1874
1875
1876
1877
1878
1879
1880
1881
1882
1883
1884
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Table A-2
GROSS LAND SALES BY THE UNION PACIFIC RAILROAD AND AVERAGE PRICE
PER ACRE OF LANDS SOLD, ANNUALLY, 1871-1883
Acres Sold
206,590
172,108
177,084
236,230
111,050
125,905
69,016
318,903
243,337
176,202
96,060
292,159
867,871
Value
$ 795,558
755,431
983,030
1,099,467
404,462
375,541
343,768
1,557,082
1,007,856
850,089
474,343
1,250,364
2,701,115
Average Price
Per Acre
$4.29
4.26
4.52
4.65
3.66
2.98
4.98
4.88
4.14
4.82
4.94
4.28
3.11
SOURCE: Richard Cleghorn Overton. Burlington West: A Colonization
History of the Burlington Railroad. Cambridge, Massachusetts:
Harvard University Press, 1967, p. 532.
Year
1871
1872
1873
1874
1875
1876
1877
1878
1879
1880
1881
1882
1883
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GROWTH OF RAILROADS IN THE UNITED STATES
1840-1880
Railroads have been built in the United States primarily for
four reasons:1
1) to provide fast overland routes between established markets
hitherto connected by circuitous or slow routes;
2) to extend central markets by networks radiating from important
trade centers;
3) to tap the vast potential trade of the Mississippi River Basin;
and
4) to open for settlement and commerce inland regions formerly
inaccessible.
In the first phase of railroad construction, up through 1840, lines
were built primarily to connect the various established markets along
the East Coast and the Eastern Great Lakes region. By 1850, they were
being built to extend central markets, and by 1860, they were being
expanded into the Mississippi River Basin. Finally, by 1870, railroads
were being built for all four reasons. (See the maps on the next four
pages.) All of the railroads in this study were originally constructed
for the second reason, particularly to develop transportation routes to
feed to the growing trade center of Chicago.
'Most of the information in this section is taken from the book
by Richard Cleghorn Overton, Burlington West: A Colonization History
of the Burlington Railroad [45]. In particular, the maps on the next
four pages dated, 1840, 1850, 1860, 1870, and 1880,are from pages 12, 24,
190, 310, and 394, respectively.
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Table C-1
TITLES AND DATES OF MAJOR RAILROADS
Title
Chicago & North Western
Chicago, St. Paul, Minneapolis, & Omaha
Pacific Coast
Northern Pacific
Great Northern
Chicago, Burlington, & Quincy
Burlington Northern
Chicago, Milwaukee, & St. Paul
Chicago, Milwaukee, St. Paul, & Pacific
Chicago, Rock Island, & Pacific
Minneapolis, St. Paul, & Sault Ste. Marie
Wisconsin Central
Duluth, South Shore, & Atlantic
Soo Line
1860-Present
1866-Present
? -1969
1883-1969
1889-1969
1855-1969
1961-Present
1874-1927
1927-Present
1859-Present
1848-1961
1897-1961
1886-1961
1961-Present
NOTE: Sources for all data in this appendix are the Annual Reports
of individual railroads (4; 6; 7; 8; 9; 11; 16; 22; 39; 43;
48; 52; 63] and the railroad report summaries in the Interstate
Commerce Commission's Annual Report on the Statistics of
Railways in the United States [331.
Date
Table C-2
FREIGHT TONNAGE --BY RAILROAD
CHICAGO & NORTH WESTERN SYSTEM, ROCK ISLAND LINE, AND MILWAUKEE ROAD
(thousands of tons)
Chi
North
(1860
8
7
6
5
5
5
5
4
3
3
5
6
6
6
4
not availab
Chicago & North Western System
Chicago, St. Paul,
cago & Minneapolis, &
Western Omaha
-Present) (1866-Present)
3,515 n.a.
1,382 n.a.
1,228 n.a.
4,112 n.a.
6,231 12,371
4,818 12,280
5,383 12,531
0,102 8,568
5,096 7,952
0,882 7,074
4,236 11,104
6,100 11,421
1,421 11,278
4,440 12,954
6,759 9,809
le NOTE: Totals may not add
Rock Island Line
Chicago, Rock
Island, & Pacific
(1859-Present)
49,068
52,210
43,332
41,933
40,191
38,141
41,937
24,328
22,346
20,417
37,375
43,540
36,103
34,799
28,485
Year
1974
1970
1965
1960
1955
1950
1945
1940
1935
1933
1930
1929
1925
1920
1915
n.a. =
Total
83,515
71,382
61,228
54,112
68,601
67,097
67,914
48,670
43,048
37,956
65,340
77,521
72,698
77,394
56,567
due to rounding.
Milwaukee Road
Chicago, Milwaukee,
St. Paul, & Pacific
(1874-Present)
45,813
45,229
47,730
39,148
45,481
50,165
52,326
35,321
34,358
29,182
49,653
59,131
55,932
51,057
40,344
Table C-3
FREIGHT TONNAGE--BY RAILROAD, BURLINGTON NORTHERN SYSTEM
(thousands of tons)
Burlington Northern System
Chicago,
Pacific Great Northern Burlington, Burlington
Coast Northern Pacific & Quincy Northern
Year (?-1969) (1889-1969) (1883-1969) (1855-1969) (1961-Present) Total
n. a.
209
315
n.a.
n. a.
362
295
253
523
663
n. a.
n. a.
200
not available
50,329
49,644
68,456
54,110
54,977
40,048
32,623
19,883
35,714
44,142
38,162
38,501
27,153
NOTE: Totals may
30,710
26,197
30,613
28,008
29,324
18,543
17,125
15,111
23,530
28,567
26,770
28,129
21,812
not add due to rounding.
148,793
135,910
1974
1970
1965
1960
1955
1950
1945
1940
1935
1933
1930
1929
1925
1920
1915
n.a. =
57,586
49,248
49,183
49,057
56,143
31,014
31,324
28,602
49,406
56,326
51,506
57,301
40,340
148,793
135,910
138,625
125,296
148,567
131,174
140,444
89,966
81,367
63,850
109,173
129,698
116,438
123,932
89,504
Wisconsir
Central
(1897-1961
n. a.
n. a.
n. a.
n. a.
n. a.
n. a.
n. a.
n. a.
n. a.
n. a.
n. a.
n. a.
-not available
Table C-4
FREIGHT TONNAGE--BY RAILROAD, SOO LINE SYSTEM
(thousands of tons)
Soo Line System
Minneapolis,
Duluth, South St. Paul, &
Shore, & Atlantic Sault Ste. Marie S
) (1886-1961) (1848-1961) (196
2,770 16,298
3,147 18,184
3,243 18,355
2,793 17,963
2,145 12,611
2,009 10,306
1,352 8,963
2,966 15,384
4,277 19,094
4,611 18,684
3,921 16,625
2,859 13,898
NOTE: Totals may not add due to rounding.
Year
1974
1970
1965
1960
1955
1950
1945
1940
1935
1933
1930
1929
1925
1920
1915
n. a.
I,
00
oo Line
1-Present)
27,325
24,021
21,254
Total
27,325
24,021
21,254
19,068
21,331
21,599
20,756
14,756
12,315
10,315
18,350
23,371
23,294
20,545
16.757
,
Table C-5
FREIGHT TONNAGE--A COMPARISON TABLE
(thousands of tons)
Western b
Chicago & Burlington Rock Island Milwaukee Soo United States United Statese
Year North Western Northern Line Road Line (Total) (Total)
1974 83,515 148,793 49,068 45,813 27,325 1,049,615 2,880,426d
1970 71,382 135,910 52,210 45,229 24,021 942,626 2,793,324
1965 61,228 138,625 43,332 47,730 21,254 880,557 2,741,707
1960 54,112 125,296 41,933 39,148 19,068 809,004 2,409,040
1955 68,601 148,567 40,191 45,481 21,331 912,908 2,745,379
1950 67,097 131,174 38,141 50,165 21,599 610,279 2,710,919
1945 67,914 140,444 41,937 52,326 20,756 654,739 2,961,789
1940 48,670 89,966 24,328 35,321 14,756 575,863 1,947,479
1935 43,048 81,367 22,346 34,358 12,315 403,371 1,502,590
1933 37,956 63,850 20,417 29,182 10,315 355,051 1,322,463
1930 65,340 109,173 37,375 49,653 18,350 624,250 2,179,015
1929 77,521 129,698 43,540 59,131 23,371 727,099 2,584,333
1925 72,698 116,438 36,103 55,932 23,294 672,210 2,463,725
1920 77,394 123,932 34,799 51,057 20,545 657,982 2,427,622
1915 56,567 89,504 28,485 40,344 16,757 494,097 1,828,692
NOTE: Totals may not add due to rounding.
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NOTES FOR TABLES C-2 THROUGH C-5
NOTE: Exact figures may vary due to the following reasons. (1) It
is a practice of the Interstate Commerce Commission to update yearly
reports as new figures come in. An attempt has been made to use the
most up-to-date figures available. (2) The Interstate Commerce
Commission makes a distinction among Class I, II, and III railroads
(by amount of freight carried, where Class I railroads are major lines
and Class III railroads are small traffic lines). Where possible,
aggregate figures are the total of all three. (3) The Interstate
Commerce Commission also makes a distinction between revenue and non-
revenue freight. Where possible, the total of both is given, but in
some cases, including all Western United States and United States
total figures, only revenue freight tonnage is listed.
aWisconsin Central Railroad data are not available because the
Wisconsin Central is a Class III railroad and the Interstate Commerce
Commission does not publish individual Class III railroad data, nor
does it require individual Class III railroads to publish their own
detailed data.
bRefers to Class I railroads only.
cIncludes Classes I and II only, except for 1929 and 1933
figures, which are for Classes I, II, and III.
dThe 1974 figure is actually for 1973.
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A GUIDE TO THE BIBLIOGRAPHY
For each of the five railroads, a primary reference was
used giving the history of that railroad. The historical material
in this report was drawn mainly from these five books:
Chicago & North Western: Pioneer Railroad: The Story of the
Chicago and North Western System by Casey and Douglas [5],
Burlington Northern: Burlington West: A Colonization History
of the Burlington Railroad by Overton [45, an updated version
of 46 and 47],
Milwaukee Road: The Milwaukee Road: Its First Hundred Years
by Derluth [15],
Rock Island: Iron Road to Empire: The History of 100 Years
of the Progress and Achievements of the Rock Island Lines
by Hayes [24], and
Soo Line: Saga of the Soo: West from Shoreham. An Illustrated
History of the Soo Line Railroad Company and Its Predecessors
in Minnesota, the Dakotas, and Montana by Gjevre [21].
One other book was particularly useful for historical information:
The Story of American Railroads by Holbrook [29]. For a brief but
complete history of each railroad, see Moody's Transportation Manual
[40].
The Burlington Northern Railroad Company was formed in 1961.
After eight years of working towards Interstate Commerce Commission
approval, the Burlington, which had no railroad lines of its own, in
1969, merged with the Pacific Coast, the Northern Pacific, the Great
Northern, and the Chicago, Burlington, & Quincy railroad companies, now
called the Burlington Northern Railroad. All annual reports are so listed.
For specific statistical information, the annual reports of
each railroad [4; 6; 7; 8; 9; 11; 16; 22; 39; 43; 48; 52; 63] provide
very detailed data, but a more useful source is the Interstate Commerce
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Commission's Annual Report on the Statistics of Railways in the United
States [33], which summarizes the annual reports of the individual
railroads. The Economics of Transportation by Locklin [36] gives a
good account of competition, regulation, and railroad rate setting,
while Railroad Leaders, 1845-1890: The Business Mind in Action by
Cochran [12] goes into considerable detail on empire building.
Railroad land grants are discussed in "The Railroad Land Grant Legend
in American History Texts" by Henry [26], "Comments on 'The Railroad
Land Grant Legend in American History Texts"' by Ellis and others [17],
and Statement Showing Land Grants Made by Congress to Aid in the
Construction of Railroads, Wagon Roads, Canals, and Internal Improve-
ments, Together with Data Relative Thereto by the U.S. General Land
Office [61].
The theme, "The Problem with Railroads Today Is . ," introduced
on pages 15-31of this report is also discussed in American Railroads
and the Transformation of the Ante-bellum Economy by Fishlow [18]
and Enterprise Denied: Origins of the Decline of American Railroads,
1897-1917 by Martin [37].
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